One standard kind of moral fictionalism maintains that many of the moral claims we ordinarily accept are in fact false, but these claims are still useful to produce and accept, despite this falsehood. rivals, moral fictionalism faces its own special challenges. If functional role determines semantic content, then for all we know that content is representational; if it rather characterizes what speakers do in uttering moral sentences, then it is an account of moral pragmatics rather than semantics. Moral fictionalism is the doctrine that the moral claims we accept should be treated as convenient fictions. F. Nietzsche’s view of truth as a useful lie and the pragmatic theory of cognition are close to fictionalism. Indeed it is commonly thought that moral decisions should always be dictated by personal conscience, a supposition compatible with the universality and categoricity of moral reasons but incompatible with the premise.
I’ll point out that, from a prima facie glance at fictionalism you’d think that the fictionalist should agree with (5), since she thinks that we should hold on to our moral beliefs and that murder is wrong even if you have an opportunity to benefit from it is among our moral beliefs. Moral fictionalists claim they can recover many of the benefits of the use of moral concepts and moral language, without the theoretical costs incurred by rivals such as moral realism or traditional moral noncognitivism. Substituting a functional-role semantics for the primitive expressivists’ semantic behaviourism, Gibbard offers a formalism in which moral terms have a common content across embedded and free-standing occurrences. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. His critique is a tour de force, as good a critical treatment of expressivism as one can find. As Kalderon surveys the current metaethical landscape, he perceives a dilemma. : in no familiar game of make-believe does some fictional element of the game present an actual appearance. Many modern versions of fictionalism are influenced by the work of Kendall Walton in aesthetics. Two other features of Kalderon’s view bear special mention. moral conflict, we find that when people move between “distinct normative perspectives”, they experience a “normative aspect shift: … different features of [their] circumstance become salient and present a different normative appearance” (44). Lines of Thought. Acceptance on behalf of others involves regarding others to have “no need … to inquire further — [they] may simply take [one’s] word for it” (23), and this is surely why it is governed by noncomplacency, unlike acceptance merely for oneself. It seems to be particularly ascriptions of. This intriguing account raises many questions. The Death of Morality Moral Fictionalism Richard Joyce on what happens when falsehoods are too useful to throw out.. There was a problem loading your book clubs. Kalderon’s case that moral judgements are not beliefs may be ingenious, but unfortunately it is not convincing. Although billed as an argument to the “best” explanation, Kalderon does not discuss any other possible explanations to show them inferior. View Moral fictionalism Research Papers on Academia.edu for free. This possibility constitutes a novel form of non-cognitivism, moral fictionalism. Bring your club to Amazon Book Clubs, start a new book club and invite your friends to join, or find a club that’s right for you for free. But is the account intended to extend to ascriptions of moral obligations, virtues, and reasons? Most users should sign in with their email address. (2) Because of the, of morality, moral acceptance is always on behalf of others. Mark Eli Kalderon argues that morality is a fiction by means of which our emotional attitudes are conveyed. Lines of Thought. Features (a)© spell out a familiar view of the universality and categoricity of moral reasons, but do not entail that we must think that others should accept moral claims on our authority. There therefore seems to be room for legitimate doubt about Kalderon’s second premise. “Noncognitivism”, he suggests, properly names a view about the kind of attitude involved in moral judgement (viz., that they are not beliefs), rather than a view about the kind of content that moral judgements have. Although fictionalist approaches to morality are currently in vogue, this proposal is radically different from other recent versions, which maintain that our moral judgements involve systematically false beliefs and counsel that we do best to continue practicing moral judgement, but now as a convenient fiction (Joyce, The Myth of Morality 2001, Nolan, Restall & West, “Moral Fictionalism vs. the Rest” 2005). The 13-digit and 10-digit formats both work. Moral Fictionalism (Lines... Primitive forms of expressivism commit the pragmatic fallacy; as forms of semantic behaviourism they conflate an account of the use of moral sentences with an account of their content. To have a moral attitude is to structure your experience so that certain features are salient or appear to be reasons; it is “literally” to decide how you feel about the circumstance (50-1). But is the account intended to extend to ascriptions of moral obligations, virtues, and reasons? A Clarendon Press Publication. Fictionalism absolutizes the concepts and methods of thinking used in cognition that have no direct analogues in reality, for example the construction of ideal objects, working hypotheses, and several forms of modeling, and on this basis repudiates the theory of reflection. Access to the full content is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. You could not be signed in. To normative but nonmoral properties and reasons? Accessibility Information, : in a context of disagreement with an epistemic peer about the existence of reasons to accept or reject the claim, we have some obligation to subject the claim to further critical scrutiny. Search for other works by this author on: You do not currently have access to this article. Significant doubts can also be raised about the third premise. A Clarendon Press Publication. Close attention to fundamental disagreement between reasonable epistemic peers, he claims, reveals that beliefs and moral judgements are not governed by the same norms. A number of features of the account seem more suited to construal as belief or perception. The aim of discourse in any given domain is not truth, but some other virtue(s) (e.g., simplicity, explanatory scope). To establish the truth of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) Kalderon cites four different features of morality’s authority as grounds for moral acceptance being always on behalf of others: (a) precedence — moral reasons can override conflicting nonmoral reasons; (b) noncontingency — moral reasons are not contingent on anyone’s moral acceptances; © well-groundedness — the reasons that ground moral claims are reasons for acceptance for everybody; (d) “demand” - utterance of a moral sentence expresses a demand that the audience accept it. His solution is that moral judgements involve an affective attitude of make-believe towards a representational content. For it is also logically consistent with moral fictionalism, whose most common version maintains that, because morality is useful in certain respects, we should continue to make moral utterances and have moral thoughts, while at the same time refraining from asserting such utterances and … As is widely acknowledged, this presents the primitive expressivist with an irresolvable dilemma: either (a) simple moral sentences have the same content whether embedded or free-standing - in which case, contra expressivism, their content cannot consist in the expression of pro or con-attitudes — or else (b) the content of simple moral sentences differs according to their occurrence as embedded or free-standing — which, among other costs, renders apparently valid moral arguments invalid.
Your disagreement with me despite possessing the same evidence gives me reason to reconsider my belief.
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